This article seeks to analyze the sources of the Sheikh Hasina government's India-positive foreign policy approach from theoretical and empirical standpoints.
Introduction
This article seeks to analyze the sources of the Sheikh Hasina government's India-positive foreign policy approach from theoretical and empirical standpoints.
Theoretically, it engages three broad schools of thought and their competing claims about state foreign policy behaviour. These claims then are examined in the context of Bangladesh's foreign policy towards India. It is argued here that three levels-individual, unit/national and external environments-need to be engaged together to understand the sources of the Sheikh Hasina government's India policy.
The article is organized into five sections. First, it provides a theoretical discussion on the sources of states' foreign policy behaviour and the debate surrounding it. In the second section, the article presents an overview of the historical evolution of Dhaka' 
Theoretical Perspectives: Sources of State

Foreign Policy Behaviour
Scholars of International Relations have vigorously debated the sources of state foreign policy behaviour, but have yet to reach a consensus on the issue. Some scholars argue that domestic factors determine a state's international behaviour; they are known as the Innenpolitik school of thought. A second group-the Aussenpolitik school-holds that the external environment is the key determinant of a state's foreign policy behaviour. These two schools have traditionally dominated the theoretical debate on this issue, although a third group of scholars, who may be considered as the Integrative/Inclusivist school of thought, is discernible in the debate, who argues that while both the traditional perspectives are right in highlighting internal and external variables, they are wrong in prioritizing one over the other. A synthesis of both sets of variables as well as an inclusion of individual/psychological level variables, these scholars argue, are required for a complete understanding of state foreign policy behaviour. These perspectives are explained below in greater detail.
Innenpolitik School
Scholars of the Innenpolitik school of thought argue that a state's foreign policy is determined by the forces and pressures of domestic politics. Although opinions vary among the scholars within this school on the relative importance of various domestic variables, such as political and economic ideology, national character, partisan politics, socio-economic condition, state institutions, the existence and strength of interest groups, bureaucratic politics, the configurations and preferences of dome stic actors, etc., they all share the common assumption that a country's foreign policy is primarily driven by internal political factors. The roots of foreign policy of a state, therefore, must be located in the social, economic and political structures of states and their configurations and dynamics (for a general discussion on this perspective, see Fearon, 1998; Rose, 1998; Wittkope & McCormick, 2008) .
The Innenpolitik school has a long historical pedigree. Its roots can be traced as far back as Plato. Over the centuries, many scholars have viewed that domestic political dynamics determine external politics rather than the vice versa and this Innenpolitik view has been the key source of criticism against Realism which, as will be discussed below, privileges external factors over the internal ones in explaining state foreign policy behaviour. Marxists, for example, in critiquing Realism have contended that the causes of international conflict could be found within state socio-political and economic structures (Lenin, 1916) . Similarly, Liberals have argued that democratic states pursue peaceful foreign policies and non-democratic states go to war due to the lack of check and balance in their political structure (Brown, 1996; Doyle, 1983) . Domestic politics, therefore, must be included in any analysis for a complete account of foreign policy (Katzenstein, 1978) . Towards the end of the Cold War and following its end, some scholars within the realist tradition became disillusioned with neo-realism's overemphasis on structural sources of state behaviour and called for bringing unit level analysis back within realist theory (Levy, 1988; Snyder, 1991; Zakaria, 1992) . Therefore, domestic factors are significant in any analysis of state foreign policy behaviour.
Aussenpolitik School
The Aussenpolitik school argues that there is the Primat der Aussenpolitik-'the primacy of foreign policy'-in states' international behaviour.2 Kenneth Waltz, the guru of neo-realism, contends that the structure of the international system determines the behaviour of states (Waltz, 1979) . This contention highlights the argument of the Aussenpolitik school of thought on state foreign policy behaviour.
Offensive realism, in particular, argues that systemic pressure is the chief determinant of state behaviour in an anarchic international system. Scholars of this variant of structural realism view the international system as 'Hobbesian' in which security is 'scarce'; hence states, as rational egoists, are forced to enhance their relative power position in the system. The key consequence of such anarchy in the international environment is that it is very likely that inter-state conflict will occur.
Hence, foreign policy is driven by state motivation to enhance its relative power position in the system for security, and systemic pressures and opportunities are the key determinants of states' international actions. This means, contrary to the position of the Innenpolitik school, differences in internal characteristics of countries are relatively unimportant compared to systemic pressures and, regardless of domestic characteristics, similarly situated states will demonstrate similar external behaviour (Gilpin, 1983; Labs, 1997; Mearsheimer, 1990 Mearsheimer, , 2001 ).
Defensive realism, compared to offensive realism, has a softer view about anarchy and its impact on state behaviour. Scholars of this brand of structural realism posit that the international system is less 'Hobbesian' and provides incentives for moderate and reasonable behaviour, and that security is not 'scarce', but 'plentiful' (Evera, 1984 (Evera, , 1985 Levy, 1987; Posen, 1984; Posen & Evera, 1987; Snyder 1984; Walt, 1989 Walt, , 1990 . State behaviour is not motivated primarily by aggressive power maximization, and a state responds only to existing real threats instead of hypothetical ones. Some situations, of course, may lead security seekers to fear each other, but such situations are not common. Therefore, an aggressive foreign policy is unnecessary and counter-productive (Walt, 1987) . Put simply, the position of defensive realism is that systemic factors influence some kinds of foreign policy behaviour, but not all; when the security dilemma is at a fever pitch, a state will behave aggressively and its behaviour will be driven by systemic incentives; but in normal circumstances, which are more common in the international environment, systemic incentives will play only a marginal role in the foreign policy behaviour of states.
Following the end of the Cold War, when structural realism was on the back foot, a group of realist scholars began to reformulate realist arguments in light of the changed international environment. They attempted to bridge the arguments of offensive and defensive realism while emphasizing how domestic politics plays a critical role in states' responses to structural conditions and pressures.
Branded as neo-classical realism, the scholars of this perspective advanced the argument that a country's foreign policy is driven foremost by its place in the international system measured in terms of relative material power capabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the international system. However, the impact of such capabilities is 'indirect' and 'complex' because systemic forces must be translated through an intervening variable at the unit level (Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro, 2009; Rose, 1998; Schweller, 1996; Zakaria, 1992) . As foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders, it is their perception of the country's relative power that matters most in the making of policy choices, not the relative quantities of physical resources (Rose, 1998, p. 147) .
Leaders, of course, are constrained by both international and domestic factors.
As leaders may not have complete control over the resources to be used for pursuing foreign policy, it is important to look at the strength and structure of institutions relative to their societies. It will indicate how resources are distributed and how much is allocated for foreign policy, which, in turn, will have an impact on policy choices. Despite acknowledging the role of domestic factors, neo-classical realist scholars still privilege external variables by arguing that foreign policy theorizing must begin at the systemic level, that is, by interpreting a state's relative position in the system and analysis of unit level variables comes subsequently (Zakaria, 1992) .
The key difference between neo-classical realism and the two strands of structural realism-offensive and defensive-is that while the latter two realisms assume that states seek security, neo-classical realist scholars by contrast posit that states seek to control and shape the external environment in response to the uncertainties of international anarchy (Zakaria, 1999) . International anarchy, neoclassical realists believe, is neither Hobbesian nor benign, rather it is murky and opaque. The key implication of this postulate is that it is difficult to clearly tell whether security is scarce or plentiful, hence states must dwell in twilight and act accordingly.
Integrative/Inclusivist Perspective
Some analysts criticize the Innenpolitik and Aussenpolitik schools of thought by making the point that they focus either on domestic level variables or systemic factors in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of states.3 Such a partial focus, they contend, does not provide a good account of states' foreign policy behaviour.
The relationship between international and domestic politics is a two-way traffic and one cannot be privileged at the expense of the other. Rather, the scholars of this perspective maintain, the challenge is how to integrate variables from both the levels and build a framework that can explain which part of foreign policy is influenced by systemic factors, and which part of it is driven by domestic independent variables. Robert Putnam argues that it is 'fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse'. In his view, the challenge really is to know and theorise 'when' and 'how' external and internal politics are entangled and influence the foreign policy behaviour of states (Putnam, 1988, p. 427) . Similarly, Zakaria maintains that 'a good account of a nation's foreign policy should include systemic, domestic, and other influences, specifying what aspects of the policy can be explained by what factors' (Zakaria, 1992, p. 198) .
Paul Kennedy provides a sophisticated analysis of integrative perspective contextualising Wilhelmine German's Weltpolitik. He specifies which part of the Wilhelmine foreign policy can be explained by systemic factors, and which parts can be explained by domestic structures and Kaiser Wilhelm's personality (Kennedy, 1982) . Therefore, three levels-systemic, national and individual/personalneed to be taken into account in a sophisticated and complete analysis of a state's international behaviour. 
Bangladesh's India Policy and Bangladesh-India
Relations, 1971-2008
India, as a close and overarching neighbour with far larger capabilities, has been a key factor in Bangladesh's foreign policy ever since the country gained independence in 1971 (Ahmed, 1984; Chauhan, 2012; Hassan, 1989) . Many analysts view Bangladesh as an 'India locked' state as the country is surrounded by India on three sides (except 271 km of land border out of 4142 km with Myanmar) and the southern sea outlet-the Bay of Bengal-is dominated by the Indian navy (Iftekharuzzaman, 1989, p. 18 ). Given such a geopolitical location, it is only natural that India historically has figured prominently in the foreign policy of Bangladesh.
Since 1971, Bangladesh-India relations have experienced ups and downs, but the 'India factor', as a positive force or a negative one, has remained constant and continued to affect Bangladesh's foreign policy behaviour. Indeed, Dhaka's foreign policy in the past four decades can be seen in a binary fashion: 'pro-India' or 'anti-India'. Such a distinction may seem arbitrary, but it helps to understand the extent of India's influence in Bangladesh's foreign policy. The general trend has been that when an AL government was in power in Bangladesh, it adopted an India-positive foreign policy, while non-AL governments generally maintained an attitude of mistrust towards New Delhi and pursued counterbalancing strategy vis-à-vis India.
The first post-independence government of Bangladesh led by the AL pursued a clear pro-India foreign policy, and during its short tenure from 1971 to 1975, Dhaka and New Delhi developed a very close, cooperative relationship, which is generally dubbed as a period of 'honeymoon' (Rashid, 2010, p. 89) .
The key reason for adopting such an India-positive foreign policy orientation by the AL government was India's contribution to Bangladesh's independence.
During the war of independence, India not only provided diplomatic and moral support, it also hosted more than 10 million Bengali refugees for months and, more significantly, intervened militarily and played an instrumental role in the defeat of the Pakistan army in East Pakistan and the birth of independent Bangladesh (on the 1971 war, see Jackson, 1975; Sisson & Rose, 1990) . New Delhi accorded recognition to Bangladesh as an independent state on 6 December 1971, well before the war ended. Hence, it was not surprising that Dhaka pursued an India-positive foreign policy and that the two countries developed a close relationship in the aftermath of the war. Notwithstanding the building of such a friendly relationship, 'seeds of discord' on some issues, however, developed in the later years of the AL tenure (on this, see Hossain, 1984; Hussain, 1989) These developments led to a sharp deterioration of Bangladesh-India relationship during the time of Zia's military rule. New Delhi further hardened its position on Dhaka when Zia began to build a domestic support base by emphasizing a religious identity for the state, which essentially had an anti-India connotation.5
As Bangladesh-India relations became hostile, the Zia regime adopted a counterbalancing strategy by fostering closer ties with China, Pakistan and Muslim countries in order to ease New Delhi's pressure on Dhaka.6 Dhaka's action raised security concerns in New Delhi and went against India's long-held regional security strategy.7 The gap in the security perceptions and strategies of the two countries gradually widened in the ensuing years as both began to pursue mutually destabilising policies. For example, India began to assist Shanti Bahini guerrillas in the Chittagong Hill Tracts who were fighting for regional autonomy, while Bangladesh began to collaborate with China and Pakistan to transfer arms to insurgents in northeast India.8 Consequently, an 'insecurity spiral' set in motion between India and Bangladesh, which deepened their mutual mistrust and hostility. Against such a background, New Delhi hardened its position on various bilateral issues, particularly on the sharing of common river waters that left a devastating environmental impact on Bangladesh. It was clear that the relationship was destined to become hostile in the years to come.
The tenure of the first military regime came to an abrupt end in 1981 when General Ziaur Rahman was assassinated in a military coup. It took place in a regional city, Chittagong, which prevented the coup plotters to capture state power. In the presidential election that followed, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)9 candidate, Abdus Sattar, was elected and formed the next government.
The Sattar government's tenure was short-lived as the army chief, General H.M. the two countries worked cooperatively to resolve the longstanding dispute over the sharing of the Ganga river water (Hossain, 1998) . Although the bilateral relationship of the two countries considerably improved, there were limits to this improvement due to two reasons. First, the AL had a narrow majority in the parliament, which meant that the government had little room to manoeuvre against strong opposition from several political parties, such as the BNP and the Jamat-eIslami. Second, following the installation of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in India in 1998, the steady improvement of Bangladesh-India relations was halted. A key reason for this was that the BJP government prioritized the issue of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh to northeast India in its approach towards building a better relationship with Dhaka (Wright, 2007) .
Relations between the two countries began to deteriorate again when the BNP returned to power by winning the 2001 general elections. The policies of the two countries once again hardened as they developed mutual suspicion in which New Delhi suspected that Bangladesh had a hand in the insurgencies of northeast India10 and Dhaka perceived that India was trying to destabilize Bangladesh.
Hence, the old pattern of mutual suspicion and hostility returned in BangladeshIndia relations during the tenure of BNP regime. 
Water Sharing
The sharing of waters of the common rivers is immensely significant for Bangladesh because it is the lower riparian of almost all 54 rivers that flow through the two countries.12 As India increases the use of water for industrial use and domestic use and withdraws more and more water upstream, this rings alarm bells in Bangladesh as it faces adverse environmental, economic and sociopolitical consequences (Gaan, 1998; Islam, 1991) . There is also significant resentment in Bangladesh over India's plan for integrated water development which will divert water from India's eastern region to the west and south. Additionally, India's plan to construct a dam at Tipaimukh on the river Barak, which is a tributary of a major river-the Meghna, has raised concern in Bangladesh. The fear in Bangladesh is that it will adversely affect the country in numerous ways. The Hasina government has expressed Bangladesh's concern to New Delhi and raised the issue when Manmohan Singh visited Dhaka in September 2011. Singh assured Hasina that India would not do anything that might harm Bangladesh (Prothom Alo, 2011a).
Although Dhaka and New
In the past five years India has strived to accommodate Bangladesh's water interest more than any other time in the past. Notwithstanding the persistence of disputes over the sharing of common river waters, which is natural given the geographic character of the region, both Bangladesh and India have worked to improve bilateral relationship in recent years.
Land and Maritime Boundaries and Enclave Issues
Originating in the 1947 partition of the subcontinent in the wake of the British Additionally, India has offered its assistance to build a 1320 MW electricity production plant in Khulna as a joint venture. Given Bangladesh's severe power shortage, India's assistance could play a vital role in meeting domestic power demand and propelling economic growth. In her first foreign trip to Dhaka in June 2014, barely a month after assumption of office, the BJP government's External Affairs minister Sushma Swaraj has offered an additional 100 MW of electricity from the Palatana Plant in Tripura.
Transit
New Delhi has long demanded transit facilities from Dhaka to better connect its remote, impoverished northeast region with the mainland. Bangladesh refused to accede to this demand arguing that doing so would create security risks and infringe the country's sovereignty. In fact, Dhaka's refusal was not so much about security or sovereignty as it was about the poor state of the relationship between the two countries for decades.
A policy shift on the transit issue occurred when the Hasina government revised Bangladesh's India policy and as relations between the two countries began to improve. Sheikh Hasina informed Indian authorities during her visit to New Delhi in 2010 that Bangladesh, in principle, had decided to allow India (and also Nepal and Bhutan) to use the Bangladeshi sea ports of Chittagong and Mongla and the inland water port of Ashuganj (Ejaj, 2010) . After more than a year of negotiations, 
Explaining Sheikh Hasina Government's India Policy Approach
As is evident, the Hasina government, after assuming power in January 2009, adopted a new policy approach towards India, departing from the policy of its predecessor non-AL governments. Consequently, the relationship between the two countries has improved markedly. There were, as noted above, at least three options before the Hasina government when deciding upon its foreign policy orientation: There is no easy, straightforward answer to the above question because it involves variables that derive from at least three different sources/levels: personal, national and regional/international. Those variables in concert explain, as is discussed below, the Hasina government's policy approach towards India.
Individual/Personality Factor
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is the dominant figure within her party, the AL, as well as within the government. Owing to a variety of factors, which are discussed below, she is personally inclined to pursue an India-positive foreign policy and build a closer relationship with that country. To understand the AL government's India policy, one needs to look at the personality of Sheikh Hasina.16 Indeed, to properly appreciate the role of Sheikh Hasina in her government's policy making structure, it is necessary to look at the political culture of Bangladesh, particularly the aspect that relates to the critical importance of certain personalities in Bangladesh politics. Since independence in 1971, Bangladesh politics arguably has evolved in a manner in which personalities, rather than institutions, have been more important. Political parties have seldom practiced a democratic process in choosing the party leaders or office bearers. Bangladesh political parties are personality-centric and revolve around the party leader. Hence, when a party comes to power, the central figure of that party dominates the government and its decision-making.
A quick look at the major political parties of the country makes the point clear.
The AL, for example, was dominated by the personality of Sheikh Mujibar Rahmam in the 1970s (Franda, 1982) and since the early 1980s, the party has been dominated by the personality of Sheikh Hasina. Similarly, the BNP was dominated by General Ziaur Rahman in the second half of the 1970s (Jahan, 1980) policy cannot be directly established; however, it is logical to assume that she must have felt a debt of gratitude to the Indians for the generosity she received during those difficult years of her life. Moreover, during her exile in Delhi, she developed personal friendship with many Indian leaders. Here again, although a causal link between this and her government's India-positive foreign policy cannot be established, it would nonetheless be fair to make a general point that such personal factors are important in diplomacy and foreign policy choices in general.
Additionally, Sheikh Hasina's ideological stance-a commitment to secularismis arguably a significant factor in understanding her world view and foreign policy approach. As India is a secular state, hence Hasina's ideological orientation and the experience of 1971 make it natural for her to favour an India-positive foreign policy rather than choosing Pakistan or China as a counter-weight to India.
The key point to take home from the above discussion is that the personality factor is important in Bangladesh politics and the government decision-making structure, and that Sheikh Hasina played a decisive role in choosing an Indiapositive foreign policy orientation of the AL government. She continues to play a dominant role in the continuation of the policy option that was adopted at the beginning of her government in 2009.
Notwithstanding the critical importance of the personality factor, it is imprudent to neglect the significance of the role of other factors which primarily derive from the national level variables and the external environment. To say that Sheikh Hasina plays a central role in foreign policy decision-making does not mean that she has complete freedom or control over foreign policy decision-making and/or its practice. She is constrained by domestic political dynamics and configuration of forces within the state as well as the external forces. After all, foreign policy is not made in a vacuum. Internal dynamics and external environment constantly put limits and constraints on decision makers. For example, the major opposition political party-the BNP-was created by the first military ruler General Ziaur Rahman on an anti-India platform and in building the party he significantly used Islam as a tool. Hence, the BNP generally pursues a foreign policy which is not India-positive. Now, the BNP has an alliance with Jamaat-i-Islami which is inherently anti-Indian. As noted earlier, they receive support from a section of the Bangladesh polity which prefers an Islamic identity for the Bangladesh state.
Consequently, it constrains Shekih Hasina's freedom to pursue India-positive foreign policy in view of the fact that a section of Bangladesh population opposes building closer ties with India. The implication of this is that even though her personality was instrumental in choosing an India-positive foreign policy orientation, its success (or lack of it) is determined by impersonal forces beyond her control. Therefore, the Hasina government's India policy needs to be viewed as a product of competing forces and pressures. Further, impersonal factors that influence her perception put constraints and limits on her government's actions. The key point here is that she might have made the choice to adopt an India-positive foreign policy orientation, but her policy practice is constantly affected by factors beyond her control and her foreign policy does not always function in a way that she always wishes.
Unit/National Level Factors
Domestic-level variables are at play in the Hasina government's India policy. Indeed, variables of this level work in a contradictory fashion. Some of them facilitate her government's positive policy approach towards India, while others impose constraints and limits. Most significantly, the latter set of variables negates Sheikh Hasina's freedom of action on India policy, which deserves careful consideration.
The AL's ideological orientation was a strong facilitating factor in the Hasina government's decision to adopt an India-positive foreign policy. As noted above, the Bangladesh polity is more or less equally divided into two broad sections in terms of national identity. A first group emphasises the Islamic character of the polity, while the second group prefers secularism as the state ideology. The AL represents the views of the latter section of the polity, which draws the party closer to India. The historical pattern of Bangladesh-India relationship reflects that when the Indian National Congress in India and AL in Bangladesh are in power, the relationship between Dhaka and New Delhi tends to be closer. When the AL came to power in 2009, a Congress-led United Progress Alliance was in government in New Delhi. Hence, an argument can be made that ideological affinity of the two political parties brought Dhaka and New Delhi closer. Of course, it is also noteworthy that in general an AL government tends to develop better relations with India than any other party in Bangladesh.
On the other hand, those who emphasize Islamic identity tend to position themselves on the other side of the scale; that is, if the secularists see India as a ' natural' friend, the Islamists see that country primarily through the opposite prism. As noted earlier, the revival of Islamic identity in Bangladesh politics after 1975 had an anti-India tone. Several major political parties, including the BNP, represent this section of the Bangladesh polity. The division within the Bangladesh polity on identity makes India an important factor in the political dynamics of the country, particularly in election politics (Pattanaik, 2005) . The implication of this factor for the AL government's India policy is that it constrains Sheikh Hasina's and her government's freedom of action in pursuing an India-positive foreign policy.
The scope and continuity of the Hasina government's India policy is, therefore, greatly affected by the country's domestic politics.
Regional/International Factors
Rapid transformation in the regional/international geo-economic and geo-political structure after the end of the Cold War has had a profound impact on the Hasina government's adoption and pursuit of India-positive foreign policy. For one thing, the transition of the South Asian region and even beyond has been a key factor that informed the perception of the Hasina government's policy elite, including Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. For another, a pragmatic appreciation of the changes at the regional and international levels has made it imperative to adopt foreign policy that would serve its political and economic security.
Bangladesh's geopolitical location makes it India-dependent in many respects.
The country is not only surrounded by India on three sides, it is also the lower riparian of almost all 54 common rivers. The key implication of this factor is that it is daunting for Bangladesh to make progress by pursuing an anti-India foreign policy and maintaining a hostile relationship with that country. Hence, prudence suggests that Bangladesh must work with, and not against, India to promote its interests and progress. This perception is common among the Hasina government's policy elite. For example, Gowher Rizvi, Sheikh Hasina's international affairs advisor, maintains that in Bangladesh there is 'a realisation that India is our biggest and closest neighbour, and the earlier policy of hostility is futile in a rapidly globalising society' (The Hindu, 2011).
The view that Bangladesh must work with India for its own interest became even more important in the context of the latter's gradual rise as a global power.17
Since India adopted economic reform policies in 1991, its economy has grown at a rapid pace and is now poised to become the world's third largest economy in the coming decades. Further, the growing strategic partnership between India and the United States symbolized in particular by the conclusion of a landmark nuclear 
Conclusion: Theoretical Implications
The Hasina government's India-positive foreign policy does not derive from a single source, it is indeed a product of multiple interactive variables emanating from different sources/levels. These variables can be located at the personal, national/domestic and regional/international levels. It is difficult to prioritize one factor over another in analyzing the AL government's foreign policy pursuits. Therefore it is evident that the unit level factors alone cannot provide a complete understanding of the Hasina government's India policy.
As the preceding section has highlighted, identity at the personal and unit level has played an important role in Hasina's India policy. Here the Constructivist approach of International Relations appears to provide an explanatory framework for understanding Dhaka's policy approach towards India under Sheikh Hasina (an influential work on Constructivism is Wendt, 1992) . Although the issue of identity is critical in shaping Sheikh Hasina's foreign policy, it is difficult to ignore other non-identity factors. For example, the identity formation at the unit level is influenced by India's behaviour towards Bangladesh. Hence, it can be posited that despite its significance, it only provides a partial account of Hasina's India policy approach.
Neo-classical realism's arguments come very close to explaining the foreign policy of the Hasina government, as it combines both domestic and external/ systemic factors. However, its claim that foreign policy analysis must begin by explaining a state's relative power position in the international system does not quite fit in the case of the Hasina government's foreign policy, particularly since there was no significant change in the structural position of Bangladesh vis-à-vis India. Furthermore, counterbalancing is clearly not the preferred option of the Sheikh Hasina government's foreign policy towards India. An explanation of Sheikh Hasina's India policy, therefore, needs to begin by looking at her personal preference or domestic political dynamics rather than Bangladesh's relative power position in the international system or its position vis-à-vis India.
The Integrative perspective, particularly Paul Kennedy's approach, does provide a better framework for understanding the Hasina government's India-positive foreign policy orientation. The Hasina government's foreign policy highlights that variables can be located at three levels-personal, unit/national and external-and they act in a complementary and interactive manner. For example, the Indian behaviour towards Bangladesh influences domestic public opinion and political dynamics in Bangladesh, which in turn influences Dhaka's policy approach towards India. Indeed, it is possible to look at different parts and stages of Sheikh Hasina's India policy by employing variables at different levels. For example, the initial decision to foster closer ties with New Delhi was based on Hasina's own personal preference. Subsequently, the practice of that policy was modified by constraints imposed by domestic and regional/international variables. For example, at the domestic level, the BNP-led alliance which includes Jamaat-i-Islami is opposed to closer ties with India, at least to the extent that the Hasina government intends to pursue. Therefore, it is arguable that for a complete account of foreign policy one should not privilege a particular source, rather appropriate variables should be identified to explain different parts of a country's foreign policy. 2. There are two competing arguments in this regard within the Aussenpolitik school.
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